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ALD-046        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1243 
___________ 
 
NORA ISABEL MONTOYA-AGUILAR, 
            Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                             Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A098-119-745) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Jeffrey L. Romig 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 9, 2017 
 
Before: MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 1, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Nora Isabel Montoya-Aguilar petitions for review of the Agency’s decision 
denying her application for asylum.  The Government has filed a motion for summary  
action.  We will grant the Government’s motion and will deny the petition for review.   
  Montoya-Aguilar is a citizen of El Salvador who first entered the United States in 
in 2004.  She returned to El Salvador after an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered her 
removal to that country.  Montoya-Aguilar later returned to the United States, this time 
with her minor daughter.  The Government reinstated her previous order of removal and 
placed her in a “withholding only” proceeding pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.31(e) and 
1241.8(e), in which she could apply for withholding of removal but was ineligible for 
asylum.  The Government also served Montoya-Aguilar with a notice to appear charging 
her daughter as removable.  Ultimately, an IJ granted Montoya-Aguilar withholding of 
removal and granted her daughter asylum.  Montoya-Aguilar argued that she was eligible 
for asylum as well, but the IJ concluded that she was ineligible under the regulations 
referenced above. 
 The Government appealed the IJ’s grant of withholding for Montoya-Aguilar, and 
she appealed the IJ’s denial of asylum.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
dismissed both appeals on the merits.  As to Montoya-Aguilar, the BIA agreed with the IJ 
that the regulations referenced above rendered her ineligible for asylum. 
 Montoya-Aguilar petitions for review.  Her sole challenge is to the BIA’s reliance 
on the regulations in deeming her ineligible for asylum.  She argues that those regulations 
are inconsistent with the statute that provides for eligibility for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 
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1158(a).  When Montoya-Aguilar filed her brief, that issue was under consideration in 
Cazun v. Attorney General, C.A. No. 15-3374.  Thus, the Government moved to hold this 
petition in abeyance pending our decision in Cazun, and we granted that motion. 
 The Court has since decided that case.  See Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d 249 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  In Cazun, we held that the regulations Montoya-Aguilar challenges as 
inconsistent with § 1158(a) are reasonable interpretations of the relevant statutory 
scheme, including § 1158(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), and are entitled to deference 
under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  See Cazun, 856 F.3d at 259-60.  Thus, we rejected petitioner Cazun’s challenge 
to the BIA’s reliance on the regulations in that case and denied his petition for review.1 
 After we decided Cazun, the Government filed a motion for summary action in 
this case arguing that Cazun is controlling and requires that we deny Montoya-Aguilar’s 
petition for review as well.  We agree.  Cazun squarely rejects the sole issues and 
arguments that Montoya-Aguilar has presented on review, and she has not filed a 
response to the Government’s motion to argue otherwise.  See Mendoza-Ordonez, 869 
F.3d 164, 168 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying Cazun in rejecting an identical challenge).   
 
 
                                              
1 Although not strictly relevant to our analysis, we note the factual similarity between this 
case and Cazun.  Both cases involved mothers who returned to the United States with a 
minor child and, in both cases, the Agency granted withholding to the mother and asylum 
to the child.  In Cazun, we discussed the practical differences between those forms of 
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Thus, we will grant the Government’s motion for summary action and will deny the 
petition for review. 
                                                                                                                                                  
relief.  See Cazun, 856 F.3d at 252 n.3. 
